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The Eighth Circuit Set to Grapple with Sexual Orientation
Discrimination
By Kenny Bohannan*
The Eighth Circuit is set to weigh in on a topic of recent interest to many of
her sister circuits: whether Title VII’s bar on employer discrimination
“because of … sex” encompasses a bar on discrimination based upon sexual
orientation as well. Slated for oral arguments en banc this term, Horton v.
Midwest Geriatric Management is poised to definitively answer this
question in the Eighth Circuit.
In Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Management, Mark Horton alleged that
Midwest Geriatric Management withdrew an offer of employment after he
disclosed he was married to a same-sex partner.1 This claim was dismissed
with the District Court largely relying upon the Eighth Circuit’s 1989
holding in Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc. that “Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”2
The Second and Seventh Circuits have recently found that Title VII bars
discrimination based upon sexual orientation. The Second and Seventh
Circuits in Zarda v. Altitude Express and Hively v. Ivey Tech Community
College, respectively, revisited and overturned longstanding circuit
precedents accepting three different legal theories that sexual orientation
discrimination is barred by Title VII: (1) discrimination based upon sexual
orientation is necessarily discrimination “because of … sex,” (2) sexual
orientation discrimination is a form of “associational discrimination,” and
(3) sexual orientation discrimination is a form of impermissible “sex
stereotyping.”3
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1 Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Management, No. 4:17CV2324 JCH, 2017 WL 6536576, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2017).
2 Id. at *3 (quoting Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)).
3 See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Conversely, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, the Eleventh Circuit has
recently reaffirmed a longstanding precedent that “[d]ischarge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII...”4
This is not a question of first impression for the Eighth Circuit. In
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., a gay male alleged he was
terminated for being openly homosexual in violation of Title VII.5 In a brief
opinion, the Eighth Circuit held that “Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination against homosexuals.”6 This single sentence served as the
beginning and end of any legal analysis of Title VII’s applicability to sexual
orientation discrimination in Williamson. Although Horton may provide
the same legal conclusion as Williamson, legal spectators should expect a
much more thorough analysis of the issue.
Williamson did not grapple with the Supreme Court’s holding in Price
Waterhouse that discrimination based upon “sex stereotypes” were
impermissible under Title VII.7 Lower courts have had “difficulty in
drawing a line between sex stereotypes, which are actionable under Title
VII, and notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality, which are not.” 8
Such line-drawing can result in odd results where an openly homosexual
man would be able to pursue a “sex stereotyping” theory if he faced
discrimination for being perceived as “effeminate,” but not if he were
discriminated against for merely being homosexual, as in that case he
would still be conforming to the male stereotype.9 This line drawing has led
some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Hively, to call this line between
sexual orientation discrimination and sex stereotype discrimination so

850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
5 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
6 Id.
7 It should be noted that Williamson was decided after Price Waterhouse, but only within a
few months.
8 Pambianchi v. Ark. Tech Univ., 95 F.Supp.3d 1101, 1114 (E.D. Ark. 2015).
9 Bre Wexler, Let’s Call It What It Is: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 12 (2018) (“In other words, employees who
experience discrimination based on apparent gender nonconforming behaviors may be
successful on their Title VII sex discrimination claim, whereas those who experience
discrimination as a result of purely being homosexual would not.”).
4
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“gossamer-thin” that it does not exist at all.10 The Eighth Circuit should be
expected to address these arguments in Horton, either clearing the
confusion for how these lines should be drawn or following the Seventh
Circuit’s conclusion that they do not exist at all.
The precedent upon which Williamson relied only reinforce the need for
the Eighth Circuit to address Price Waterhouse’s applicability to sexual
orientation discrimination claims. The only brief citation provided for
Williamson’s conclusion that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against homosexuals,” is to the Ninth Circuit’s 1979 abrogated opinion in
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.11 In DeSantis, three male employees
alleged sex-based discrimination by their employer because they were
homosexuals.12 In rejecting their Title VII claim the Ninth Circuit
“conclude[d] that Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in
mind,” holding that “sex” for the purposes of Title VII was meant to be
construed narrowly.13 Further, in DeSantis, an additional plaintiff alleged
he was terminated for wearing an earring to work as a school teacher.14 This
plaintiff alleged that “the school’s reliance on a stereotype that a male
should have a virile rather than an effeminate appearance violate[d] Title
VII.”15 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding “that discrimination because
of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality. . . does not fall
within the purview of Title VII.”16
However, in 2001 the Ninth Circuit largely abrogated this holding in
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. to conform to the mandates
of Price Waterhouse.17 In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit expressly overturned
DeSantis’ holding regarding discrimination based upon a male employee’s
effeminacy.18 The Ninth Circuit held that effeminacy was indeed a sex
stereotype prohibited as described in Price Waterhouse and that insofar as
DeSantis can be read to conflict with Price Waterhouse, it is no longer good
Hively v. Ivey Tech Community College, 853F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
Williamson, 876 F.2d at 70.
12 DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1979).
13 Id. at 329.
14 Id. at 328.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 331-32.
17 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
18 Id.
10
11
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law.19 However, Nichols did not go so far as to say that sexual orientation
discrimination is sex-stereotyping in and of itself.
Williamson’s brief analysis relied solely upon now-abrogated DeSantis. The
Eighth Circuit’s revisiting of this issue is appropriate to now explain how
much (if any) of Williamson’s holding remains good law.
Regardless of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Horton, a circuit split will still
exist, leaving eventual resolution of this legal question at the Supreme
Court’s doorstep.
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